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Abstract
In virtually all jurisdictions that explicitly price carbon, its average (emissions-
weighted) price remains low. Our analysis focuses on the political economy of its
introduction as well as its stringency in an international panel of national and
North American subnational jurisdictions. Results suggest that political economy
factors primarily affected the former and that policy stringency is a highly persistent
process. This has two important policy implications. First, successful passage of
carbon pricing legislation will either come with contemporaneous compensation of
incumbent, CO2-intensive, sectors or occur after their relative weakening. Second,
if political economy constraints continue to prevail, a robust rationale for the design
of climate change mitigation strategies with multiple instruments exists.
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1 Introduction
The agreement reached in Paris at the end of 2015 was a diplomatic success. Its envi-
ronmental benefits are, however, much less clear. If fully implemented, current Intended
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) submitted to the UNFCCC Secretariat
place the world on an emissions path that is incompatible with least-cost 2◦C scenar-
ios, the goal stated in the Accord (United Nations/Framework Convention on Climate
Change, 2015).1
As the IPCC Working Group II “reasons for concern” make clear, this level bears
significant risks for human development and is likely to place unprecedented pressure
on already stressed ecosystems (IPCC, 2014). Therefore, supplementary commitments to
reduce Greenhouse Gases (GHG) emissions beyond existing INDCs are needed. This will,
in turn, require the setting up of new (or the strengthening of existing) environmental
policy tools. Historically, these tools took the form of “command-and-control” regula-
tions, production quotas and subsidies for electricity from renewable energy sources and,
more recently, carbon pricing instruments such as carbon taxes or cap-and-trade systems
(Bennear and Stavins, 2007).2 The focus of this paper is on the latter category.
While the earliest occurrences of these tools can be traced back to the experiences of
Northern European states (Finland - 1990, Sweden - 1991), their development has only
gained momentum in the last few years. According to World Bank (2018), thirty-eight
new carbon pricing mechanisms started operations between 2005 and 2018, including the
California Cap-and-Trade Program and 7 (sub-national) emissions trading schemes in
China. These new schemes added to a group of existing carbon pricing tools such as the
European Union Emissions Trading System or a range of taxes explicitly based on the
carbon content of fossil fuels.
Yet, the introduction of such tools is often faced with strong political economy con-
1Compared with the emission levels under least-cost 2◦C scenarios, aggregate GHG emission levels
resulting from the implementation of the INDCs are expected to be higher by 8.7 (4.5 to 13.3) Gt CO2
eq (19 per cent, range 9-30 per cent) in 2025 and by 15.2 (10.1 to 21.1) Gt CO2 eq (36 per cent, range
24-60 per cent) in 2030 (United Nations/Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2016).
2Carbon per se is not a greenhouse gas but carbon dioxide (CO2) is. We refer to instruments putting
a price on CO2 emissions as carbon pricing instruments.
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straints (Jenkins, 2014) that influence their design and prevent their full (i.e. socially
optimal) implementation (Del Rio and Labandeira, 2009). Their influence on the im-
plementation of carbon pricing policies is nonetheless currently under-researched. While
substantial attention has been paid to the political economy of energy or renewable en-
ergy support (RES) policies, a relatively narrow set of studies have specifically focused on
policies making use of carbon pricing mechanisms, be it in a specific national or subna-
tional context, or in an international panel of countries. Furthermore, such studies often
focus on policy outcomes as proxies for policy developments but do not directly study
the policy tool itself (see, e.g. Cadoret and Padovano (2016) or Gassebner et al. (2011)).
Our study is a contribution to filling this gap. It aims at shedding light on the
nature and working of political economy constraints on the development of carbon pricing
policies. This allows us to address two fundamental questions pertaining to the design
of climate mitigation strategies in the presence of political economy constraints. How
should we adapt the policy design to a specific institutional and economic context? Do
political economy constraints constitute a robust rationale in favour of a policy mix as
opposed to a single instrument?
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant strands of the
literature. Section 3 briefly discusses carbon pricing (in theory and practice). Section
4 introduces the Emissions-weighted Carbon Price and presents the hypotheses while
section 5 presents the data and discusses the empirical methodology used in the analysis.
Section 6 discusses the results and section 7 concludes.
2 Literature review
More often than not, economic policies resulting from the legislative and political
bargaining process constitute sub-optimal social outcomes. Political economy theory
provides a useful analytical framework to rationalise them. Olson (1965) highlights the
role played by groups with shared interests in shaping policy outcomes and the factors
that drive their behaviour. Building on Olson’s conjecture, Stigler (1971) proposed the
idea of regulatory capture, which views the State as a provider of regulation and the
industry as an active seeker of regulation designed and operated for its own benefit.
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The relevance of these theoretical insights has long been discussed in the context of
environmental policy making (Pearce, 2005). Congleton (1992) takes an institutional
perspective to the issue; proposing that political institutions, rather than resource en-
dowments, determine a country’s environmental regulation. More precisely, he argues
that due to their focus on longer term outcomes, democratic institutions tend to deliver
more stringent environmental regulations.3 At the same time, democratic systems allow
a plurality of, sometimes divergent, interests to be voiced. Hahn (1990) attempted to
identify rationales for the emergence of incentive-based mechanisms and suggested that
environmental policy is the result of a “struggle” between different interest groups. In
the context of carbon pricing, the introduction of (economy-wide) schemes may induce
profound changes in the magnitude and distribution of welfare. Therefore, even if the
welfare of the polity as a whole is greater in an economic system constrained by envi-
ronmental policies, one may expect strong opposition on the part of both consumers and
producers. On the consumption side, some studies have shown that the willingness to
pay for carbon emissions is low (Jenkins, 2014). Moreover, carbon pricing schemes have
been found to be regressive, with varying degrees, in a wide range of institutional con-
texts (Wier et al., 2005; Grainger and Kolstad, 2010), with only some of them designed
to alleviate this effect (Bowen, 2015). On the production side, sectors with assets whose
value would be severely diminished in case of carbon pricing are expected to strongly
oppose policy change; a possibility that Joskow and Schmalensee (1998) discuss in the
case of the U.S. SO2 market.
Analyses taking advantage of the availability of panel data have also shed light on
political economy dynamics. Marques et al. (2010) analyse the drivers of the deployment
of renewable energy in European countries. Using fixed effects (panel data) regression
and vector decomposition, they find evidence that the conventional energy sector lobby
and the level of CO2 emissions impede the deployment of renewable energy sources for
electricity production. Chang and Berdiev (2011) focus on the electricity and gas in-
dustries and seek to disentangle the effects of government ideology, political factors and
3This argument runs against the standard view that political representatives are self-interested and
focused on short-term electoral cycles.
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globalisation on energy regulation in 23 OECD countries over the period 1975-2007. They
conclude that left-wing governments promote regulation in gas and electricity sectors and
that less fragmented governments contribute to deregulation of gas and electricity indus-
tries. van Beers and Strand (2015), analysing data from 200 countries for the political
determinants of fossil fuel pricing during the period 1991-2010, found that higher GDP
levels lead to higher fuel prices (higher taxes or lower subsidy rates) and that a presiden-
tial system (unlike parliamentarian or proportional representation systems) could lead to
significantly lower gasoline and diesel prices.
Lastly, insights drawn from analyses of the liberalisation of energy markets are also
relevant to our investigation. Pollitt (2012) takes stock of the energy market liberalisation
processes to draw lessons about the role of policy in energy transitions and argues that
liberalisation per se will have little impact on the shift toward a low carbon energy
mix. Rather, the willingness of societies to bear the cost of environmental policies will.
Hence, liberalisation is not necessarily neutral for carbon pricing policy formulation as
it has made the cost of those policies increasingly apparent to consumers (Pollitt, 2012).
Evidence from the U.S. (Jenkins, 2014) suggests that citizens are indeed quite sensitive to
the direct costs induced by carbon pricing policies, even if the net cost is brought (close)
to zero via tax rebates or other fiscal mechanisms.
However substantial the discussion of political economy factors in environmental pol-
icy formulation has been, relatively less attention has been paid to the political feasibility
of carbon pricing policies and, equivalently, to the variables that influence their imple-
mentation and strength. To our knowledge, only Jenkins (2014), Gawel et al. (2014) and
Del Rio and Labandeira (2009) bring the issue to the fore. Shedding further empirical
light on these dynamics is particularly important as we believe that they may differ in
nature or in strength from those of: (i) excise duties, which in most occurrences con-
stitute an indirect way to tax road transport; (ii) other climate policies, whose cost is
less visible to the final consumer. In the absence of more refined assessment, suggestions
about a way forward for the implementation of carbon pricing when faced with political
economy constraints are, at best, incomplete. Before turning to that analysis we briefly
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review the rationale and tools for a carbon price.
3 Carbon pricing policies: theory and practice
In theory, provided that the public authority can credibly commit to a state-contingent
carbon price path and in the absence of transaction costs, the carbon price signal should
be economy-wide (Tirole, 2012).4 Indeed, the externality associated with the release of
GHG into the atmosphere is the same regardless of its source (i.e. sector of origin) or type
of use. Any departure from this situation will inevitably introduce distortions between
sectors and/or types of users.
Two market-based mechanisms (and hybrid combinations5) have emerged: carbon
taxes and Emissions Trading Schemes. The former places a set price on each unit of
CO2 emitted into the atmosphere, leaving an uncertainty about the resulting level of
emissions; the latter sets an emissions cap and leaves to the market the creation of the
price signal. Even though both mechanisms share the same underlying motivation and,
under complete knowledge and perfect certainty, are theoretically equivalent and deliver
the same environmental outcome, they relate to two slightly different views about carbon
pricing.6 The first view emphasises the use of carbon pricing mechanisms to internalise
the externality associated with GHG emissions and hence is more sympathetic to carbon
taxes. In that case, the price of carbon should closely track the Social Cost of Carbon
(SCC). The second stresses the achievement of a set carbon budget over a given planning
horizon in a cost-effective way, in which case the price will follow the dynamically cost-
effective price path (Rubin, 1996).
Importantly for us, these schemes differ also in their practical implementations. On
the one hand, most carbon taxes are based on the carbon content of fossil fuels. On the
4If transaction costs (i.e. costs of monitoring and verification) are positive, then optimal coverage
may not be 100%. Additional emissions should then only be included if the marginal benefit in terms of
enhanced cost efficiency outweighs the marginal cost of monitoring and verifying emissions.
5Hybrid schemes combine elements of price and quantity schemes by, e.g. setting floors and caps on
the prices delivered by quantity schemes (Roberts and Spence, 1976; Weitzman, 1978).
6Outcomes may differ when there is uncertainty about either the marginal cost or benefit of abatement
and the relative superiority of one instrument over the other depends on the relative slopes of the marginal
abatement and cost curves around the optimum (Weitzman, 1974). Weitzman’s original article considers
only a static one-period model and so is more relevant to flow rather than stock pollutants like CO2 but
his conclusions were supported in theoretical settings closer to that of stock pollutants (Pizer, 2002; Hoel
and Karp, 2002).
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other hand, an Emissions Trading Scheme is based on actual verified emissions at covered
(stationary) plants.7 Therefore, an ETS can in theory include fugitive and industrial
processes emissions in addition to emissions from fuel combustion.
In 2015, the last year of our panel(s), 35 national and 21 subnational jurisdictions had
an operating Emissions Trading Scheme while 15 national and 1 subnational jurisdiction
had a carbon tax targeting at least one type of fossil fuel (i.e. coal, oil or natural
gas). Among jurisdictions operating an ETS at the time, 47 covered industry and 54
covered the power sector while the same sectors were included in 14 and 12 carbon tax
schemes, respectively. Table 1 provides a summary of sectoral coverage per type of pricing
mechanism.
Table 1: Sectoral coverage (2015) – # of jursidictions
Carbon tax schemes ETSs
(total: 16) (total: 57)
Industry 14 47
Power 12 54
(Road) Transport 12 5
Aviation (domestic) 4 31
Buildings (residential and commercial) 12 8
Agriculture or Forestry 11 2
Waste 12 1
Note: The figures presented in this table count each jurisdiction participating in the EU-ETS as a
separate scheme. A description of the sectoral nomenclature is available in appendix B and a complete
list of the jurisdictions operating a carbon pricing mechanism in 2015 is available in appendix D.
4 Carbon pricing and its drivers
Following on the above discussion, we argue that introducing a carbon pricing mecha-
nism involves two decisions. First, a decision on whether or not to enact a pricing scheme,
regardless of the price level or the coverage. Second, a decision about the appropriate
– or politically feasible – stringency (i.e. average price). The implementation of car-
bon pricing policy is recorded by a dummy variable taking value 1 if it is in force in a
given country-year, 0 otherwise. The stringency is captured by the average (emissions-
weighted) carbon price and is described in section 4.1. The hypotheses formulated about
the drivers of implementation and stringency are presented in section 4.2.
7Emissions from the aviation sector, which have recently been included in some ETSs, are estimated
based on the fuel consumption of each aircraft, multiplied by the appropriate emissions factor (European
Commission, 2012).
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4.1 Carbon price and coverage: an Emissions-weighted Carbon
Price
Following ‘first-best’ theoretical prescriptions, applied macroeconomic integrated as-
sessment models often assume a single, economy-wide (100% coverage) carbon price. Yet,
experience with carbon pricing policies suggests that their implementation has rarely, if
at all, followed such prescriptions. For example, most of the schemes under considera-
tion entailed low coverage at time of introduction – due to, e.g., sectoral or fuel-based
exemptions, or a combination of the two – and their coverage remained partial over their
lifetime. Moreover, careful observation of policy developments shows little consistency
between the stated environmental goals (and implied GHG budgets) and carbon prices.
Therefore, the price tag alone cannot appropriately reflect the stringency of a carbon
pricing scheme. It has to be analysed together with its coverage. Moreover, as will be
shown in section 4.1.2, the carbon price is usually not unique within jurisdictions, let
alone across them.
In order to accurately account for these two dimensions of carbon pricing mechanisms
and reflect their stringency, we introduce the concept of an Emissions-weighted Carbon
Price (ECP).8 This price, computed on a yearly basis, is a weighted average of all carbon
price signals present in an economy at a point in time where the weights are the quan-
tity of emissions covered as a share of that jurisdiction’s total GHG emissions. To our
knowledge, this is the first attempt at capturing the stringency of carbon pricing policies
in a consistent and standardised way.9 Before turning to a discussion of the underlying
methodology, we review its two underlying components: coverage and price.
8The methodology behind the computation of the Emissions-weighted Carbon Price is similar to that
suggested for the Effective Carbon Rate (OECD, 2015). However, the OECD methodology accounts for
both explicit carbon prices and energy duties that indirectly price carbon, which we believe is misleading
since, as we have emphasised and as the OECD itself acknowledges (OECD, 2015), the motivations
behind their introduction are often unrelated to climate change concerns.
9Measuring policy stringency is inherently difficult, even more so when the metric needs to be com-
parable across jurisdictions. Most studies rely on indirect measures of policy stringency such as private-
sector cost measures, measures based on pollutant emissions and environmental policy enforcement
expenditures (Brunel and Levinson, 2013).
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4.1.1 Coverage
The coverage of carbon pricing schemes is usually defined at the sectoral level although
carbon taxes can be defined per fuel type too. The main difference between emissions
trading schemes and carbon taxes lies in that the former sometimes cover multiple gases
whereas the latter only apply to the carbon content of fossil fuels and, by extension, to
CO2 emissions. The present paper focuses exclusively on CO2. Provided that accurate
measurement of sectoral CO2 emissions is available, sectoral coverage of a scheme can eas-
ily be translated into “covered” CO2 emissions as a share of total, CO2 equivalent, GHG
emissions. Based on this information, coverage figures were calculated for 135 national
and 63 subnational (50 US States and 13 Canadian Provinces and Territories) jurisdic-
tions as well as a hypothetical ‘World’ jurisdiction between 1990 and 2015.10 Figure 1
provides an overview of the coverage of carbon pricing mechanisms in selected jurisdic-
tions.11 Panel (a) clearly shows that there is significant variation in coverage of carbon
tax schemes across jurisdictions. Between 1992 and 2005, Denmark’s scheme covered
roughly 70% of its GHG emissions, the highest share among all jurisdictions considered,
while Finland’s coverage was only 30%. It is also striking to see that if those schemes
imply a significant coverage in terms of respective national emissions, they mean very
little in terms of world GHG emissions, as illustrated by the “World” coverage. Except
for the “structural break” observed in 2005 for some countries, which reflects the fact
that they adapted their legislation to avoid an overlap with the EU-ETS, coverage of
GHG emissions by tax schemes is, for each country individually, relatively stable over
time. Similarly, the coverage induced by the ETS in the selected countries does not show
significant variation over time. Yet, one notes that all countries that are part of the
EU-ETS exhibit different coverage figures, despite the ETS being harmonised across all
10See appendix B for a description of the methodology. At the national level, although our initial
intention was to cover all jurisdictions, the cross-section dimension of our panel has been constrained by
IEA emissions data availability while the time dimension has been constrained by CAIT data availability.
At the subnational level, our focus on North America is driven by the fact that, up to 2015, that region
concentrated most of the subnational carbon pricing schemes and that we were unable to gather robust
data on the Chinese ETS pilot schemes or the Tokyo, Saitama, and Kyoto schemes.
11Besides the ‘World’ jurisdiction, the jurisdictions for which information is presented in Figures 1 to
4 are among the earliest adopters of carbon pricing mechanisms – exclusive of the EU-ETS countries –
and for which the information is therefore available for a number of years.
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countries. A potential explanation for these cross-country differences is that they reflect
the differences in economic structure across participating countries.
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Figure 1: Carbon pricing coverage – selected (national) jurisdictions
In addition to the jurisdictions presented in Figure 1 several others have introduced
carbon pricing policies. Switzerland introduced a carbon tax in 2008 covering about 28%
of its total emissions. The coverage remained relatively stable over time, with the scheme
covering 27% of emissions in 2012. In that same year, Japan introduced a carbon tax
covering 69% of its emissions. Other jurisdictions opted for ETSs. This is the case of
New Zealand, which introduced its scheme in 2010 with a coverage of 43% (gradually
increased to 54% following inclusion of waste treatment activities in the scheme).
At the subnational level, another group of jurisdictions can be identified: US States
participating in the Regional Greenhouse Gases Initiative (RGGI). This scheme is a
regional initiative gathering initially 10 (but now 9: the state of New Jersey pulled out
of the scheme in 2012) North-Eastern US States. Figure 2 shows the implied coverage
of the scheme in the 10 participating states over the period 2009 (start year)-2012. It is
again striking to see that substantial cross-state variation characterizes coverage. New
Hampshire exhibits the highest coverage over the entire period, oscillating between 36.41%
in 2009 and 34.42% in 2014. The coverage in all other participating states is between
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13.19% (New Jersey - 2009) and 34.42% (New Hampshire - 2012). Outside the RGGI
initiative, British Columbia launched its own carbon tax scheme in 2008, covering roughly
70% of its total GHG emissions while, in 2013, California introduced a Cap-and-Trade
(CaT) mechanism covering approximately 32% of its emissions.12
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Figure 2: Carbon pricing coverage – US Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
4.1.2 Price
Coverage is only one side of the coin. The other is the price level. Countries that
have introduced carbon pricing policies have experimented with different strengths of the
price signal, which varies mainly along three dimensions: time, jurisdiction, and sector(-
fuel). In other words, the price signal varies both across and within countries, introducing
distortions between countries as well as between sectors of a given country. Importantly,
however, distortions introduced by Emissions Trading Schemes are only between covered
and non-covered sectors (since the price signal is the same across all covered sectors and
fuels) whereas a carbon tax scheme also introduces distortions at the sector-fuel level.
Figure 3 displays the total (i.e. the sum of the tax rate and the ETS allowance price,
as applicable) price of CO2 (in 2015 $US/tCO2e) in selected sectors of selected countries
12As of January 1st, 2015, new activities were added to the California CaT, increasing coverage to
about 85% of California’s total GHG emissions.
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Figure 3: Total carbon price over time – coal/peat
for coal.13 The carbon price does not vary much across fuels, suggesting that most tax
schemes apply the same tax rate to all fossil fuels. The most significant variations arise
across countries and, hence, across sectors within those countries. A look at panel (b)
of Figure 3 shows that, among the selected countries, the power sector in Sweden is
confronted to the highest price signal whereas the sectors in the other countries face
much lower carbon prices.
4.1.3 The Emissions-weighted Carbon Price (ECP)
Combining sector- or sector-fuel-level coverage and price information allows for the
calculation of an economy-wide Emissions-weighted Carbon Price (ECP). To compute
the ECP each emitted ton of GHGs is attributed the corresponding total price signal.
That is, emissions covered by either a tax or an ETS receive the associated tax rate or
permit price as price tag whereas emissions of a sector covered by both schemes receive
13Figures A.1 and A.2, available in appendix A, show the total price for oil and natural gas, respec-
tively.
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the sum of the tax rate and the permit price.14
The evolution of the ECP in selected countries over the period 1990-2015 is presented
in Figure 4. One observes that among all selected countries, only Sweden’s ECP has
increased steadily over time. All other countries exhibit either constant (e.g. Norway) or
decreasing (e.g. Denmark) ECPs. Moreover, contrary to what is generally understood,
the ECP varies across countries that are part of the EU-ETS. This is partly due to the
presence of carbon taxes in some – but not all – countries, which create an additional
price signal for some emissions. It is also, perhaps more importantly, due to differences
in the relative size of sectors and their respective CO2 intensity, as mentioned in section
4.1.1. This feature is particularly well illustrated by the ECP of states participating in
the US RGGI (Figure 5).



























Figure 4: ECP – selected jurisdictions
Lastly, note that some countries’ ECP exhibit more variability than others. For this
specific group of countries, this is due to the relative importance of emissions covered
by the EU-ETS as opposed to those covered by the respective national carbon taxes.
Indeed, the (futures) price of EUAs, i.e. EU-ETS emissions allowances, exhibited strong
variability over the sample period.
14Note that the ECP can be computed using time-varying or fixed weights. In the former case, weights
(i.e. sector-fuel emissions share) are the year-specific emissions share; in the latter, we use 2013 emissions
share. The latter is used in the empirical analysis as it is not subject to changes in emissions shares (i.e.
weights) that might have been the result of the policy itself. See appendix C for a formal presentation.
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Figure 5: ECP – RGGI
4.2 Hypotheses
We now formulate hypotheses about the determinants of policy implementation and
stringency. These are grouped as follows: (i) regulatory capture; (ii) political institutions;
and (iii) macroeconomic determinants.
4.2.1 Regulatory capture
Power sector Any form of carbon pricing that includes the power sector might impose
costs (e.g. reduced profits or capital losses) on those electricity producers that produce
electricity from fossil fuels. We expect these costs to be higher the larger the share of
electricity produced from fossil-fuelled power plants which, following Olson (1965), would
weaken the political feasibility of carbon pricing regulation. This argument needs to be
nuanced, however. First, the extent to which carbon pricing policies affect the value of
covered firms depends on their capacity to pass the additional cost through to consumers.
Under perfect competition and 100% pass through, electricity producing firms’ profits will
remain largely unaffected. With less than 100% pass through the change in equilibrium
market price will not entirely reflect the increase in cost and firms’ profit will be affected.
Second, one does not necessarily expect the electricity generating sector to react in the
same way to a carbon tax and a cap-and-trade system. In the case of the former, the
sector will, at best, remain unaffected whereas in the case of an ETS, the possibility of
capturing significant “windfall profits” exists if emissions permits are freely allocated.
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Such a possibility has probably played a significant role in dampening the opposition
of affected sectors to the introduction of such schemes. Several studies have examined
that possibility and the associated rent-seeking behaviour both theoretically (Rode, 2013)
and empirically (Markussen and Svendsen, 2005). The empirical evidence suggests that
powerful (and CO2-intensive) sectors were successful in influencing the design of GHG
trading systems. In fact, except for the US RGGI, all emissions trading schemes have
been introduced with close to 100% free allocation of emission permits (World Bank,
2014). It is difficult to explicitly account for such effects in an econometric investigation
but we note at this stage that it is likely to reduce the magnitude of the coefficients on
the variables accounting for the role of CO2-intensive sectors, including the power sector.
Industry Besides the power sector, other energy-intensive sectors, broadly defined as
“industry” are likely to oppose a carbon pricing scheme on the grounds that it holds
the potential to increase production costs. There are two channels via which costs to
industry could be pushed upward by a carbon pricing policy. A direct channel whereby
CO2-intensive industries that fall within the scope of a carbon pricing scheme will have
to pay for their own CO2 emissions; and an indirect channel whereby the introduction of
carbon pricing policies covering the electricity generating sector leads to an increase in
wholesale (and retail) electricity prices (as has been observed after the introduction of the
EU-ETS (Sijm et al., 2008)) which, in turn, might raise the production cost of electricity-
intensive industries. This argument closely follows Cadoret and Padovano (2016).
International competitiveness As emphasised by Aldy and Pizer (2012), sectors of
the economy that are export-oriented should be more reluctant to the introduction of a
carbon price as it risks putting them at a competitive disadvantage in international mar-
kets. Care is usually taken to design the schemes in ways that minimise the international
competitive disadvantage that domestic firms may suffer from but jurisdictions that are




Political regime Congleton (1992) argues that autocrats’ time horizon is shorter than
that of democratic planners and they therefore set weaker environmental targets. Yet,
Hahn (1990) also argues that liberal democracies offer the possibility for different inter-
est groups to express their views and “weigh” on the legislative process, in which case
regulatory outcomes will be a balancing act that reflects the relative bargaining power of
the different interest groups. This could work both in favour or against the introduction
of carbon pricing policies, depending on interest groups’ relative lobbying strengths.
Government ideology Prior studies have found left wing governments to implement
more stringent environmental policies (Chang and Berdiev, 2011; Cadoret and Padovano,
2016). Fankhauser et al. (2015), however, found the political orientation of the govern-
ment to be irrelevant to the number of climate laws passed in their sample of jurisdictions.
We test whether the orientation of the executive branch of government with regard to
economic policy affects the implementation and/or stringency of carbon pricing schemes.
Institutional capacity A relatively high degree of institutional capacity is a prereq-
uisite for the introduction of any form of regulation and, a fortiori, to introduce a carbon
pricing scheme. We expect institutional capacity to be positively correlated with the
presence of a carbon pricing scheme but not necessarily with the level of the ECP. In-
deed, the “institutional burden” arises from the creation of such a scheme, irrespective
of the level of the price associated with it.
International dynamics Membership of international organisations (such as the OECD
or the EU) or international institutional frameworks (such as the Annex-I countries of the
Kyoto Protocol) plays a significant role in the presence and development of carbon pricing
policies. For example, the EU, a club of countries cooperating on a wide range of issues –
including the environment, has implemented an organisation-wide emissions trading sys-
tem. Several EU Member countries currently part of the system were “dragged in” and
implemented it only because it was part of the preexisting legislative acquis (Robinson
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and Stavins, 2015). This is the case, for instance, of current EU Member States that
joined the Union in 2004, i.e. a year before the start of the EU-ETS but a few months
after Directive 2003/87/EC, which implemented the EU-ETS, was passed. Having com-
mitted to a reduction of their GHG emissions, these countries may have had an additional
incentive to develop climate mitigation strategies, including carbon pricing policies.
4.2.3 Macro(economic) determinants of environmental policy
Finally, besides the sector-specific stance towards carbon pricing and the political
institutions of a jurisdiction, we note two further factors potentially affecting implemen-
tation and stringency of a carbon pricing scheme. First, under the assumption that envi-
ronmental quality is a normal good, the willingness to pay for CO2 emissions abatement
rises with income. Therefore, we expect the income level (per capita) to be positively
associated with the probability of implementation of a carbon pricing policy as well as
the Emissions-weighted Carbon Price. Second, given the direct economic cost that pric-
ing carbon entails, larger emitters (per capita) may be less prone to introduce pricing
policies.
Table 2: Summary of hypotheses
Category Variable Expected sign Expected sign
Carbon Price (Y/N) Carbon Price (Level)




International competitiveness +/- +/-
Political institutions EU + +
Annex-I + +
Institutional capacity + n.a.
Level of democracy + n.a.
Left + +
Macro GDP per capita (WTP) + +
determinants CO2 emissions per capita - -
5 Data and identification strategy
5.1 The dataset
The analysis is performed on three different panels: 124 national jurisdictions – panel
A, 50 US States – panel B – and 13 Canadian Provinces – panel C.15 Panel A runs
15Although the ECP is calculated for 135 national jurisdictions, data availability for some of our
covariates constrains the panel dimension of our sample to 124 – models (I) and (III) – and 110 units –
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over the period 1990-2015; panel B starts in 2008 and ends in 2015; panel C covers the
years 2005-2015. This represents (a maximum of) 3224 country-year observations, 400
(US)State-year observations and 143 (Canadian) Province-year observations. The actual
emissions-weighted carbon price is only observed for those jurisdictions that have selected
into a pricing mechanism (either ETS or tax, or both). In 2015, 35 national jurisdictions,
11 US States and 2 Canadian Provinces had had a carbon pricing mechanism in force
in at least one year. That is, the ECP is observed for 420 country-year, 70 (US)State-
year and 11 (Canadian) Province-year pairs. This particular structure of the data has
implications for our empirical analysis – see section 5.3.
5.2 Covariates
This section introduces the variables used to investigate the hypotheses presented in
section 4.2.
Regulatory capture Previous literature has proxied the strength of the lobbying exer-
cised by the power/energy sector in at least two ways. First, Fredriksson et al. (2004) and
Fredriksson and Vollebergh (2009) use the share of value added of the energy industry in
total GDP. Second, Marques et al. (2010) and Marques and Fuinhas (2011) disentangled
the specific role played by different fossil fuel sources using the contribution of each of
them to total electricity production. Since coal, gas and oil electricity generation would
not be similarly affected by the introduction of a carbon pricing scheme, we follow this
last approach and use their share in total electricity generation as proxies for their influ-
ence on policy developments. To capture the lobbying activity of CO2/energy-intensive
industries, we follow Cadoret and Padovano (2016) and use the value added of industry
(as a share of GDP). Finally, the effect of trade openness is captured by the sum of a
jurisdiction’s exports and imports (as a share of GDP).
Political institutions We introduce an institutional capacity indicator, constructed
as the simple average of the World Bank’s “Government Effectiveness” and “Regulatory
models (II) and (IV). For panel A, each estimator is therefore presented for two alternative specifications
because the Left variable is not available for all panel units. In addition, panel A is unbalanced.
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Quality” indicators (World Bank, WGI, 2016). This follows Steves et al. (2011).16 The
first year of these series is 1997 but they only became available on an annual basis in 2002.
Therefore, years 1998 and 2000 are filled using a linear interpolation method. Our main
proxy for the state of democracy (Dem) comes from the Center for Systemic Peace, Polity
IV project (2015). As a robustness check, we also perform the analysis with two variables
taken from the Varieties of Democracy Database. The first (Polyarchy) measures to what
extent the ideal of electoral democracy is achieved whereas the second (Libdem) measures
performance regarding the achievement of principles of liberal democracy (Varieties of
Democracy, 2018).17
To investigate the effect of the political orientation of the executive with respect to
economic policy in national jurisdictions we create, based on Cruz et al. (2018) in Va-
rieties of Democracy (2018), a variable (Left) which takes value 1 whenever the ruling
party is identified as left wing party and 0 otherwise. The ‘0’ therefore lumps together
right-wing and centre parties as well as parties whose political platform does not take a
clear stance regarding economic policy. For panel B, the variable used (Ideology) cap-
tures the median ideology in the state’s house of representatives, as defined in Shor and
McCarty (2011). No such variable is available for subnational Canadian jurisdictions.
Finally, the effect of EU membership (EU ) is tested with the use of a dummy variable
that takes value 1 whenever a country is a member of the EU, and 0 otherwise.18
Macro determinants To control for general economic and environmental conditions,
we use GDP (PPP, $US 2011) and CO2 emissions (metric tonnes), both per capita.
5.3 Model and identification strategy
Our objective is to identify some of the determinants of carbon pricing policy imple-
mentation as well as stringency. To that end we introduce two (sets of) models. One that
relates our covariates to a binary outcome variable recording the presence of a carbon
16Correlation with the World Bank Control of Corruption estimate is also investigated, see section
6.3.
17Such variables are not available for subnational jurisdictions but their inclusion would most likely
add little to the model as there would be little cross-section and/or time variability.
18Earlier work tested the role of being listed in Annex-I and Annex-II of the Kyoto Protocol. Both
institutional features turned out to have negligible impact on our outcome variables.
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Table 3: Variable sources and summary statistics
Variable Jurisdiction Source Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Pricing National Author (see appendix) 0.12 0.33 0 1 3510
US States Author (see appendix) 0.17 0.37 0 1 400
Can. Prov./Terr. Author (see appendix) 0.12 0.32 0 1 143
ECP National Author (see appendix) 12.84 16.67 0.002 95.21 420
(time-invariant weights) US States Author (see appendix) 0.88 1.38 0.01 9.66 70
Can. Prov./Terr. Author (see appendix) 16.24 10.18 2.19 29.48 11
Elec. generation-coal, National World Bank, WDI (2016) 16.78 25.87 0 100 3477
% of total US States U.S. EIA (2015) 39.53 29.11 0 97.79 400
Can. Prov./Terr. Statistics Canada (2016a) 15.88 24.77 0 69.93 143
Elec. generation-gas, National World Bank, WDI (2016) 22.63 30.12 0 100 3477
% of total US States U.S. EIA (2015) 24.48 23.64 0 98.51 400
Can. Prov./Terr. Statistics Canada (2016a) 6.82 9.52 0 38.37 143
Elec. generation-oil, National World Bank, WDI (2016) 19 27.96 0 100 3477
% of total US States U.S. EIA (2015) 2.32 10.34 0 76.21 400
Can. Prov./Terr. Statistics Canada (2016a) 3.25 7.46 0 34.65 143
Industry VA, National UN data 32.11 11.67 6.3 84.65 3452
% of GDP US States US BEA (2016) 21.6 7.3 0 46.5 400
Can. Prov./Terr. Statistics Canada (2016b) 29.83 11.26 15.37 58.56 143
EU National Author-created 0.15 0.35 0 1 3510
Institutional capacity National World Bank, WGI (2016) 0.1 0.98 -2.19 2.26 2538
Democracy National Polity IV project 3.7 6.74 -10 10 3247
Left National Varieties of Democracy (2018) 0.33 0.47 0 1 2894
Ideology US States Shor and McCarty (2011) 0.08 0.72 -1.47 1.23 338∗
GDP per capita, National World Bank, WDI (2016) 17810.61 19575.93 354.28 129349.9 3338
PPP $2011 USD US States US BEA (2016) 47662.9 9118.25 31565.52 74417.54 400
Can. Prov./Terr. Statistics Canada (2016c) 44510.85 13280 28806.69 95355.49 143
Trade openness, National World Bank, WDI (2016) 83.14 49.01 0.02 441.60 3348
% of GDP US States U.S. Census Bureau (2016) 18.99 9.64 4.04 59.05 350∗
Can. Prov./Terr. Statistics Canada (2016c) 57.56 18.55 15.78 111.71 143
CO2 emissions, t/cap National World Bank, WDI (2016) 5.62 7.24 0.017 70.14 3283
US States CAIT (2015) 23.76 19.51 8.47 130.7 350∗
Can. Prov./Terr. Statistics Canada (2018) 20.14 13.23 6.47 52.81 143
Polyarchy National Varieties of Democracy (2018) 0.45 0.28 0.01 0.916 3176
Libdem National Varieties of Democracy (2018) 0.56 0.27 0.017 0.95 3176
Corruption National World Bank, WGI (2016) 0.02 1.05 -2.06 2.59 3150
∗The Ideology covariate is unavailable for the states of Massachusetts and Nebraska.
∗The Trade openness and CO2 emissions are unavailable for 2015.
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pricing scheme for a given jurisdiction-year entry, another relating some of these same
covariates to the stringency of the scheme. A general representation of each of them is
1it = α +ψ
′Xit + γ
′Zit + η
′Wit + dt + uit (1)
ECPit = η + δECPit−1 +ψ
′Xit + γ
′Zit + η
′Wit + dt + φi + εit (2)
where 1it is an indicator variable capturing the operation of a carbon pricing scheme,
ECPit is the Emissions-weighted Carbon Price, Xit is the vector of regulatory capture
variables, Zit is the vector of political and institutional variables and Wit is the vector
of macro(-economic) variables. φi is the unobserved jurisdiction fixed-effect while dt is
the vector of time dummy variables; ψ′, γ′ and η′ are vectors of dimensions m, n and
p, respectively, each element of which corresponds to the estimated parameter of the
associated explanatory variable. uit and εit are the observation specific error terms.
In estimating (1) and (2), two potential problems may arise. First, as much as eco-
nomic structure and electricity generation mix may affect policy implementation and
stringency, the latter can also affect the former, creating a reverse causality problem
and causing standard estimation approaches to fail. Second, there may be endogenous
selection into the policy, which would bias the coefficient estimates in equation (2).19
Reverse causality The potential presence of simultaneity bias prompts us to: (i)
note the features of the data that make our analysis less prone to it, (ii) describe the
steps taken to minimise and subsequently address this issue. First, note that 1it records
implementation, not passage of the legislation. In most cases, the year of implementation
differs from the year the legislation is passed, the former following the latter by a lag
of 1 (in the case of the EU-ETS) to 3 years (in the case of, for example, Chile’s carbon
tax). This provides a rationale for the use of lagged values of all the variables included
as regressors in equation (1) – see Table 4 – and prevents the possibility that its outcome
variable would determine the covariates – at least in a contemporaneous manner. That
19Note, however, that a selection bias would only be present insofar as the population of interest is
the entire set of jurisdictions initially present in our panels.
21
is, some regressors may only be pre-determined.
Second, an endogeneity problem only arises if the policy, once implemented, works
as intended. Carbon pricing policies were primarily designed to affect jurisdictions’ CO2
emissions through altered technological choices or structural changes in the composition
of the economy. While it cannot be ruled out that some of these policies (especially the
most stringent ones) did have the intended effects, it is worth noting that: (i) these poli-
cies affect the economy only slowly, (ii) technological advances in abatement technology
may reduce structural shifts in economic composition, (iii) except for a few jurisdictions,
most carbon pricing policies introduced over the period covered in the sample have been
relatively weak, (iv) several jurisdictions introduced said schemes towards the end of our
sample period. All this suggests that it is unlikely that the value added of industry,
which we use to proxy for the lobbying intensity of energy-intensive sectors, will be de-
termined by policy implementation or stringency. However, the same argument does not
hold as strongly for the electricity mix variables or CO2 emissions, which tend to be more
sensitive to carbon prices.
Selection We only observe the stringency for the jurisdictions that have a scheme in
operation in any given year. If there is correlation between the selection/participation
and level/stringency decision, then the process is best modelled as a model with incidental
truncation (or selection) where both a level and a selection equation are specified and
a correction for the selection bias is applied (Gronau, 1974; Heckman, 1976). That is,
equation (2) should be complemented with the introduction of a latent variable (see e.g.
Semykina and Wooldridge (2010)):
sit = 1[zitδt + φi2 + vit > 0] (3)
where 1[.] is an indicator function and sit is a selection indicator that equals 1 if ECPit
is observed and 0 otherwise.
Given the above, we implement the following econometric approach, applied to each
panel separately. First, we estimate (1) with random effect logit and probit models. All
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regressors in estimations of equation (1) are introduced with a two-period lagged value to
account for the lag between passage of legislation and policy implementation. Second, we
provide results of (FE) OLS and system GMM estimations for equation (2). In addition
to controlling for unobservable time-invariant fixed effects, the GMM estimator allows us
to account for potential endogeneity of the regressors and model the persistence of the
stringency variable. The GMM approach has been taken in Marques and Fuinhas (2011)
to study the relationship between a very similar set of covariates and renewable energy
deployment.
We correct for the selection bias following by introducing a sample selection correction
term. This term is calculated for each ECP observation using a Heckit approach adapted
from Semykina and Wooldridge (2010). In a first step, a probability of occurrence of that
observation is obtained by estimating, for each t, equation (3) using a probit regression on
the entire cross-section of jurisdictions. In a second step, this term is then included in the
estimation of equation (2) as a regressor. For panel A, the set of regressors for the selection
equation includes the electricity generation mix variables, the value added of industry,
CO2 emissions and GDP per capita, trade openness, Dem and EU.20 All variables are
introduced with a two-year lag to reflect our theoretical assumption that operation of a
carbon pricing scheme (sit = 1) is dictated by past economic and institutional structure.
For panel B, the same variables are included, except EU.21
6 Estimation results
We comment separately on the estimation of equations (1) and (2). The results
are presented for panels A, B and C. All estimations include year fixed-effects, and all
estimations of equation (2) include country fixed-effects.
6.1 Implementation
Panel A – National jurisdictions Table 4 presents the results of both RE logit and
RE probit estimations, which lead to convergent conclusions about the effects of the co-
20Institutional capacity and Left are not part of the selection equation since the former is not available
until 1997 and the latter further reduces the panel dimension.
21Given the paucity of ECP observations for Canadian Provinces & Territories (2 panel units, for a
total of 9 observations) no estimation is presented.
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variates on the decision to implement a carbon pricing scheme. First, estimates suggest
that a larger share of electricity generated from gas and oil fired power plants lowers
the probability of subsequent introduction of a carbon pricing scheme. This is in line
with our expectation that jurisdictions whose electricity generation system relies more
heavily on fossil fuels would face greater opposition to the introduction of such schemes.
The estimates of the coefficient on the share of coal in the electricity system, however,
do not indicate a consistent pattern of influence on the implementation of carbon pric-
ing mechanisms, which runs against the understanding that jurisdictions with coal fired
electricity systems would fiercely oppose the introduction of carbon pricing policies. One
potential explanation for this is that ‘dirty’ electricity producers have been granted sig-
nificant compensation in the schemes introduced so far. For example, in the case of the
EU-ETS, CO2-intensive electricity producers and heavy industries were “bought in” by
grandfathering emissions allowances in the first two phases of the operation of the system.
Second, within the sample of national jurisdictions, we find little evidence supporting the
hypothesis that larger industry or manufacturing sectors hindered the introduction of
carbon pricing policies. Although coefficient estimates are negative across all estima-
tions, they are only weakly statistically different from zero. One potential explanation
for this observation is that the set of panel units includes both strongly industrialised and
less industrialised jurisdictions, with most carbon pricing policies having been introduced
within the former group. Lastly, trade openness does not seem to have played a determin-
ing role in the introduction of carbon pricing policies. Again, one can plausibly suggest
that it is related to the fact that existing schemes have: (i) covered non-traded sectors; (ii)
provided sectoral exemptions/compensation for industries exposed to international com-
petition. Third, the institutional environment does play a role in the adoption of carbon
pricing policies. Results suggest a consistent pattern of introduction of carbon pricing
policies among jurisdictions that rank higher on the Polity IV democracy index and have
a stronger institutional capacity as calculated in this paper. This partially supports the
hypothesis formulated by Congleton (1992) that democratic institutions are conducive
to more stringent environmental regulations (a carbon price, regardless of its level, is a
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more stringent policy than no price at all) and lends support to Hahn’s conclusions (1990)
that environmental regulation is a balancing act between a variety of interests (the ac-
tual stringency is determined by the relative weight of each interest group and not by the
‘democratic’ nature of a political system). This might also suggest that the “green” lobby
is effectively given some weight in the policy making process. The economic orientation of
the executive does not seem, on the contrary, to play a significant role in the adoption of
carbon pricing policies, suggesting that, in the sample currently considered, such policies
have received support from parties across the political spectrum. This result is in line
with Fankhauser et al. (2015). The results also highlight the (international) institutional
dynamics at play in the development of carbon pricing policies as EU membership is
found to strongly affect the probability of introduction of a carbon pricing scheme, an
result that is likely to be mainly driven by the introduction of the EU-ETS in 2005. The
results also indicate that, all else equal, larger emitters (per capita) have been more to
likely introduce carbon pricing mechanisms, reflecting the fact that, until now, carbon
pricing mechanisms have been introduced in more economically advanced jurisdictions
with large CO2/capita emissions, possibly following international commitments. Finally,
GDP per capita has a positive effect on the introduction of a carbon pricing mechanism
((I) and (III)), although the statistical significance of this effect vanishes when institu-
tional capacity is accounted for ((II) and (IV)). Its magnitude changes depending on
the econometric specification but the direction of the induced change is stable across all
estimated models, strongly suggesting that economic agents are more likely to support
the introduction of such policies if they are relatively better off.
Panels B & C – US States & Canadian Provinces The results for the subnational
jurisdictions considered are broadly consistent with those based on panel A, although we
note some interesting differences.22 In the US, results indicate that electricity genera-
tion from fossil fuels negatively impacted the development of carbon pricing mechanisms,
with the largest absolute effect associated with electricity generation from oil. This latter
22Panel B contains only Ideology as political variable and panel C contains no variable reflecting the
state of political institutions.
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Table 4: Implementation – Outcome: 1
Panel Category Variable RE Logit RE Probit
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
A - National Regulatory capture – X Power-Coalt−2 -0.014 -0.016 0.01 0.043
(0.0355) (0.0358) (0.0165) (0.0184)
Power-Gast−2 -0.065
∗ -0.096 -0.029 -0.063∗
(0.0467) (0.0616) (0.0207) (0.0359)
Power-Oilt−2 -0.286
∗∗∗ -0.188∗∗∗ -0.109∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗
(0.0812) (0.0775) (0.0332) (0.0434)
Industry, VAt−2 -0.141 -0.114 -0.06 -0.054
(0.1319) (0.2163) (0.0706) (0.0943)
Trade Opennesst−2 0.023 0.008 0.01 0.01
(0.0198) (0.023) (0.0087) (0.0147)
Political Level of Democracyt−2 1.756
∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.759∗∗∗ 0.834∗∗∗
institutions – Z (0.2229) (0.4216) (0.0972) (0.2363)
EUt−2 14.449
∗∗∗ 17.9∗∗∗ 5.643∗∗∗ 11.249∗∗∗






Macro(economic) GDP per cap.t−2 0.397
∗∗∗ 0.093 0.167∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗
environment – W (0.0489) (0.1014) (0.0306) (0.0599)
CO2 Emt−2 0.153 0.199 0.045 0.036
(0.1575) (0.2003) (0.0812) (0.1103)
Constant -46.352∗∗∗ -42.879∗∗∗ -20.257∗∗∗ -33.924∗∗∗
(7.3768) (9.8192) (3.7665) (4.8143)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2726 1793 2726 1793
Standard errors in parentheses – ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: (i) The institutional capacity variable is observed for the first time in 1997, shortening the time dimension of models (II) and (IV).
Together with the lower number of panel units available for Left explains the lower number of observations; (ii) all time dummies from
2005 onwards were statistically significant at the 1% level in models (I) to (IV). We also took a different approach and introduced
a time trend. It did not, however, exhibit any significance.
effect is, however, only significant in model (VI). The results also suggest that carbon
pricing mechanisms were less likely to be introduced in states with high CO2 emissions
per capita as well as states for which (CO2-intensive) industry represents a large share
of total economic activity – consistent across models (I) and (II). Conversely, states with
relatively higher income per capita were more likely to introduce carbon pricing. The
insights obtained from panel C need to be interpreted with caution as only two Canadian
Provinces introduced a carbon pricing mechanism over our sample period. Nonetheless,
results suggest that richer (per capita) jurisdictions were more likely to introduce carbon
pricing mechanisms whereas larger CO2 emitters (per capita) or jurisdictions with rela-
tively larger industry were less likely to do so. In that regard, it is interesting to note
the contrasted dynamics between national and subnational jurisdictions. For example,
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national jurisdictions with large CO2 emissions (per capita) seem to have taken the lead
in pricing carbon (perhaps due to international commitments) whereas large (per capita)
subnational emitters have not.
Table 5: Implementation – Outcome: 1
Panel Category Variable RE Logit RE Probit
(V) (VI)







Industry, VA t−2 -2.27
∗∗∗ -1.435∗∗∗
(0.7442) (0.4267)
Trade Opennesst−2 0.304 0.202
(0.202) (0.1521)
Political Ideologyt−2 1.128 0.318
institutions – Z (3.3663) (2.3116)
Macro(economic) GDP per cap.t−2 0.691
∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗
environment – W (0.2381) (0.1765)





Year dummies Yes Yes
Observationsa 249 249
C – Canadian Prov. Regulatory capture – X Power-Coalt−2 0.544 0.208





Industry, VAt−2 -0.193 -0.092
(1.1889) (0.3729)
Trade Opennesst−2 -0.405 -0.159
(0.3713) (0.1843)
Macro(economic) GDP per cap.t−2 0.556 0.271
environment – W (0.748) (0.3140)




Year dummies Yes Yes
Observationsa 117 117
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
a Panel A: from a number of observations of 400, we lose 2x50 observations given that we use two-years lag. Panel B:
2x13 observations are lost.
Year dummies from 2012 onwards are significant in Panel B estimations. None of the year dummies for panel C were significant.
6.2 Stringency
This section discusses the estimation results of equation (2). Tables 6 and 7 present
the results for national jurisdictions and US States, respectively. Models (VII) and (IX)
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do not account for potential sample selection bias whereas models (VIII) and (X) do.
The results clearly demonstrate a very high persistency of policy stringency. This effect
is present across all panels, consistent across estimators and of the order of 0.8-0.9,
indicating that carbon pricing policy stringency changes very slowly over time. The
evidence regarding the role of the electricity generation portfolio is mixed. In panel
A, electricity generation from coal is found to have a negative (significant) impact on
the stringency of implemented schemes only in model (X). The associated estimated
coefficient suggests that an increase of 10% in the share of electricity generated from coal
would lead to a 1.2USD/tCO2e decrease in the average carbon price. Model (IX) identifies
a similarly negative effect, albeit of roughly half the magnitude identified in model (X).
Similar mechanisms are identified for the share of gas in the electricity generation mix,
which weighs negatively on the stringency of the carbon pricing policy. A 10% increase
in this share would reduce the average carbon price by between 0.9USD/tCO2e and
1.8USD/tCO2e. Next, coefficient estimates of all models except model (IX) point at a
negative effect of the relative strength of industry on the policy stringency. The magnitude
of this negative effect varies from -0.17USD/tCO2e in model (X) to -0.04USD/tCO2e in
model (VIII) for each 1% increase in the share of industry in total GDP. Results do not
support the existence of a clear relationship between trade openness and policy stringency,
most likely for the same reasons that it did not seem to decisively affect implementation.
Interestingly, results indicate that being part of the EU had a positive yet not statistically
significant impact on stringency. The magnitude of the estimated effect varies greatly
across models (VII)-(X), with the largest effect is estimated in model (X), at about
10USD/tCO2e. Finally, the effect of CO2 emissions per capita is not clearly identified,
being negative in models (VII) and (VIII) where estimates may suffer from simultaneity
bias, and positive yet with weak statistical significance in models (IX) and (X).
Insights from panel B point a similarly persistent stringency process, with a coefficient
estimate for ECPt−1 of 0.87 in model (XIV). Estimates in models (XI) and (XII) are
most likely severely biased due to the short time dimension of Panel B. The results also
suggest that larger CO2 emitters and more industrious (CO2-intensive) US States had
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Table 6: Stringency – ECP (2015 $US/tCO2e)
Panel Category Variable FE OLS FE OLS, Heck Syst GMM Syst GMM, Heck
(VII) (VIII) (IX) (X)
A – National ECPt−1 0.875∗∗∗ 0.879∗∗∗ 0.824∗∗∗ 0.824∗∗∗
(0.0438) (0.052) (0.1126) (0.1402)
Regulatory Power-Coalt 0.068
∗∗ 0.064∗ -0.0554 -0.123∗∗
capture – X (0.0261) (0.0324) (0.0773) (0.111)
Power-Gast 0.022 0.0304 -0.088
∗ -0.181
(0.0274) (0.0268) (0.0508) (0.0911)
Power-Oilt -0.016 -0.013 0.095 0.061
(0.1084) (0.1089) (0.1265) (0.1609)
Industry, VAt -0.084 -0.041 0.068 -0.173
(0.1021) (0.0918) (0.2857) (0.4142)
Trade Opennesst -0.014 -0.021 0.02 0.028
(0.0239) (0.0242) (0.026) (0.0427)
Political EUt 0.621 0.127 3.801 10.41
institutions – Z (1.0813) (0.8366) (6.101) (7.9493)
Macro(economic) CO2 Emt -0.533
∗∗ -3.352∗ 0.458 0.453
environment – W (0.2058) (1.9516) (0.5451) (0.6637)
Constant 6.186 7.861∗∗ 5.499 9.101
(4.0966) (3.6756) (16.577) (20.9732)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample selection term No Yes No Yes
Instruments GMM-sys GMM-sys
Observations 349 349 349 349
AR(1) test -3.38∗∗∗ -2.79∗∗∗
AR(2) test 0.64 0.16
Sargan (χ2) 10.12 3.95
Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Time dummies for years 2005 and 2007 to 2010 were significant in models (VII) and (VIII) but not in models (IX) and (X).
Including GDP in the stringency equation does not qualitatively nor quantitatively change the results.
The sample selection terms are significant in regressions (VIII) and (X)
more stringent carbon pricing mechanisms. These effects are, however, not statistically
significant when estimated with the GMM estimator.
6.3 Robustness checks and discussion
To test the robustness of our results, we perform a series of additional estimations.
First, to address concerns that the coefficient estimates of equation (1) may be biased
due to correlation between past residuals and current regressors, we repeat its estimation
with a sample where, for each panel unit, the time dimension is (right)-curtailed at the
year of policy adoption. That is, for each panel unit in which a carbon pricing scheme was
introduced, we keep only one observation for which 1 = 1. The results are qualitatively
similar, although statistical significance of the estimated coefficients decreases. Second,
we note that for equation (1), i.e. regression models (I) to (VI), the results do not
change qualitatively if we choose a different (meaningful) lag structure. In particular,
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Table 7: Stringency – ECP (2015 $US/tCO2e)
Panel Category Variable FE OLS FE OLS, Heck Syst GMM Syst GMM, Heck
(XI) (XII) (XIII) (XIV)
B – US States ECPt−1 1.042∗∗∗ 1.025∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 0.873∗∗∗
(0.0815) (0.0824) (0.0462) (0.0526)
Regulatory capture – X Power-Coalt -0.014
∗ -0.015∗ -0.004 -0.004
(0.0076) (0.0079) (0.0051) (0.0047)
Power-Gast -0.001 -0.0036 0 0.003
(0.0037) (0.0047) (0.0045) (0.0064)
Power-Oilt 0.025 0.027 0.142
∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗
(0.0316) (0.0372) (0.045) (0.0497)
Industry, VAt 0.018
∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.011 0.011
(0.0057) (0.0078) (0.0072) (0.0067)
Trade Opennesst 0.032
∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.006 0.013
(0.0077) (0.0082) (0.0132) (0.0171)
Macro(economic) CO2 Em(Mt)t 0.025
∗∗∗ 0.023 0.074 0.046
environment – W (0.0254) (0.0334) (0.0585) (0.0557)
Constant -0.573 -0.924∗∗ - -
(0.4375) (0.39)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample selection No Yes No Yes
Instruments GMM-sys GMM-sys
Observations 49 49 49 49
AR(1) test 1.51 1.03
AR(2) test 1.27 0.99
Sargan (χ2) 39.41∗∗∗ 25.56∗∗∗
Standard errors in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
All year dummies are statistically significant at (at least) the 5% level in models (XI) and (XII). In models (XIII) and (XIV),
year dummies 2010 and 2011 are not significant; all others are.
they are robust to the use of one-period lagged values of the regressors. Third, it can
be argued that, over the period considered, there exists a structural break in carbon
pricing policy developments as many jurisdictions introduced such policies after 2005.
To test whether the dynamics presiding over these developments differ prior and after
2005, we re-estimate models (II) and (IV) over two different time periods: 1990-2004 and
2005-2015. For the period 1990-2004, the share of electricity generated from fossil fuel is
negatively associated with the probability of implementation of carbon pricing policies.
This observation is made for all fossil fuel types, although, surprisingly, the share of
electricity produced from coal seems to have had the smallest impact of the three fuels.
This may be driven by the fact that Denmark, which was in 1990 heavily reliant on coal
for its electricity generation, managed to introduce a carbon pricing mechanism in 1992
(albeit with substantial sectoral exemptions and rebates). The more general observation
that electricity generation from fossil fuels weighted negatively on carbon pricing policy
developments may reflect the fact that until 2004, only northern European jurisdictions,
30
which have achieved a lower share of electricity generated from fossil fuel over time, had
introduced a carbon pricing scheme. In addition to this, the coefficient of EU is an order
of magnitude smaller than in the full sample models. This is likely explained by the fact
that carbon pricing activity took place in jurisdictions that were not EU members at the
start of the scheme. Over the period 2005-2015, the results for these models indicate that
EU membership was a much more significant determinant of the introduction of carbon
pricing mechanisms. This echoes the fact that a lot of these jurisdictions’ first carbon
pricing mechanism was the EU-ETS. GDP per capita, institutional capacity and the level
of democracy are both found to positively affect implementation over the period whereas
the share of industry, CO2 emissions per capita and the orientation of the executive
with respect to economic policy have a negative impact on implementation. The effects
identified exhibit, however, weak statistical significance.
We also checked whether the results were robust to the use of different indicators of
democratic institutions, namely Polyarchy and Libdem, as well as with another indicator
of governance, Corruption. Estimations of models (I) to (IV) with these variables pro-
vided very similar results, which is somewhat unsurprising given that these are highly
positively correlated with our main indicator of democratic institutions (ρ = 0.9 and
ρ = 0.85, respectively). Estimations with the (control of) corruption variable suggested
that implementation of carbon pricing policies was more likely to occur in less corrupt
jurisdictions. Finally, we repeated the estimation of regressions (VII) to (X) with a dif-
ferent version of our outcome variable in equation (2), one where the weights are varying
year-to-year. The results are, for all models considered, qualitatively similar.
7 Conclusions
Carbon pricing policies have re-emerged in the policy making arena as potential tools
to achieve (some) reductions in GHG emissions. This renewed political appetite for
carbon pricing mechanisms is apparent in the number of new schemes brought online over
the last decade. However welcome these developments are, they should not be understood
to mean that carbon pricing policies are on track to expand quickly to new jurisdictions
nor to reach the stringency that achieving the Paris Agreement target requires. Indeed,
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this article shows that, when weighted for the share of covered emissions, these policies
are, in most jurisdictions, much weaker than typically assumed. Moreover, because the
jurisdictions with carbon pricing policies represent a small share of world emissions, the
world average price of emissions remains extremely low, at about 1USD/tCO2e in 2015.
In light of the statistical results discussed in this study, this is an uncomfortable state
of affairs. First, because structural political and economic forces continue to hinder the
introduction of new schemes beyond jurisdictions for which the political and economic
cost of pricing carbon is comparatively low. For example, carbon pricing is unlikely to
appeal to jurisdictions with low GDP per capita and/or, oil-fuelled electricity generation,
for which other domestic policies, possibly complemented by international technology and
financial transfers would prove more palatable. Second, because all implemented schemes
exhibit strong persistency in their stringency, which is particularly problematic given that
most of the schemes introduced so far are associated with weak (average) price signals.
The present analysis does, however, also offer lessons – and cautious optimism – for
future policy developments. First, even if such developments are hindered by political
economy factors, their effect is not as strong as one might have initially expected and
suitable policy designs have been found to overcome them. Nonetheless, the difficulty
with which carbon pricing schemes can be introduced, together with the weakness of most
existing ones continues to provide a rationale for the development of climate mitigation
strategies with multiple GHGs abatement tools and stresses the need to carefully consider
the private and public cost of (early) retirement of the existing capital stock. This also
highlights the importance of the sequence of introduction of the climate change mitigation
policy package. One way to weaken incumbents’ lobbying power is to weaken their relative
influence prior to the introduction of carbon pricing policies.
Second, even in the presence of other climate policies, this analysis suggests that there
is room for further strengthening of carbon pricing mechanisms. This can be done through
extension of coverage or a price increase in currently covered sectors. But when consid-
ering implementation or strengthening of carbon pricing schemes, jurisdictions ought to
pay close attention to the factors discussed here as it may save them from spending time
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and political capital on policy proposals bound to be met by fierce opposition.
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A Carbon prices - data sources and details
For each jurisdiction and each year we collect carbon price data in nominal local
currency. Most jurisdictions quote the price of greenhouse gases (including CO2) per
tonne of CO2e; others (essentially those with carbon taxes) express the carbon price per
natural unit of the fuel. In the latter case, we convert the price to express it per tCO2e
using conversion factors from the World Resource Institute (World Resources Institute,
2015). All values are then converted into 2015 $US using the Official Exchange Rate
(Local Currency Unit/$US) and inflation rate from the World Bank, WDI (2016).
A.1 Emissions Trading Schemes
Table A.1: ETSs prices – details
Jurisdiction Price information
EU-ETS
European Union emissions Allowances (EUA) futures price. Annual average of daily
prices. Source: Bloomberg
Korea, Rep.
The market for Korean Allowance Units (KAUs) has been characterised by high il-
liquidity due to the absence of sellers amid concerns that the market is under-
allocated. The last trade took place on March 15, 2016 at a price of $15.53.
Source: South Korea Exchange
New Zealand
Annual average of daily spot prices of New Zealand Allowances (NZU).
Source: Bloomberg.
Switzerland
As of 2015, no transaction of Swiss emissions allowances (CHU) had taken place
over a centralised platform. Consequently, the price quoted in this study is the
volume-weighted average price at auction. Source: Swiss Emissions Registry
California(-Quebec)
Annual average of daily California Carbon Allowances (CCA) futures contract
price. Source: California Carbon Dashboard
RGGI
Volume-weighted annual average of spot transactions.
Source: RGGI CO2 Allowance Tracking System (COATS).
A.2 CO2 taxes
Information on sectoral fuel tax rates has been retrieved from a wide range of sources.
A full list of sources is available upon request. These sources include (but are not lim-
ited to): OECD Database on Instruments used for Environmental Policy (OECD, 2016),
International Energy Agency Energy Price and Taxes publication (IEA, 2016a), jurisdic-
tions’ budget proposals (as in the case of, e.g., Norway or Denmark), customs’ agencies
documentation, academic journal articles, policy assessment reports.
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A.3 Total CO2 price (oil, natural gas)
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Figure A.1: Total carbon price over time – oil
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Figure A.2: Total carbon price over time – natural gas
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B Scheme’s coverage
This methodological appendix further details the steps involved in the computation of
the coverage figures. Computing coverage figures requires defining a sectoral disaggrega-
tion of the economy. For the sake of consistency with IEA (2016b) and CAIT (2015) data,
we adopt the sectoral disaggregation recommended by the IPCC (2006) Guidelines for
National Greenhouse Gases Inventories, which is itself based on the United Nations In-
ternational Standards Industrial Classification (ISIC), Revision 4. Table B.1 summarises
the sectoral disaggregation.
Table B.1: IPCC 2006 Sectoral disaggregation
IPCC sector name IPCC sector label
Electricity Generation∗ 1.A.1.a.i
Combined heat and Power Generation∗ 1.A.1.a.ii
Manufacturing industries and construction∗ 1.A.2
Domestic Aviation 1.A.3.a.i
Road Transportation 1.A.3.b
Commercial and public services 1.A.4.a
Residential 1.A.4.b
Agriculture/forestry 1.A.4.c
Industrial Processes – cement 2.A.1
Waste 5
*In some countries and in some years, these sectors are covered by a tax and
an emissions trading system. Sometimes, however, the tax schemes are designed
to exempt those installations that are covered by the relevant ETS. Since CO2
emissions data is disaggregated at the sector-fuel level and does not, within it,
distinguish between those covered by the ETS and those that are not, it is not
possible to account for this unless one makes an assumption about the proportion
of emissions represented by the installations covered by the ETS.
The scope of an emissions trading scheme is defined at the sectoral level regardless of
the fuel from which CO2 – and other GHG – emissions originate. Therefore, an emissions
trading scheme requires the measurement of GHG emissions at the point of emission. The
design of carbon (or any other GHG)-taxes is different in that they can applied to specific
fuel(s) within particular sectors. The sectors subject to it are determined independently.
The relevant physical unit to be measured in the case of a carbon tax is therefore the fuel
consumption (and associated CO2 emissions) at the user-fuel level. The fuel categories
used in this study are: Coal/peat, Oil, Natural Gas.
The coverage information is recorded, for each jurisdiction and year, at the sector-fuel
level as a binary variable (0 if the sector-fuel is not covered, 1 if it is). This coding is
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based on various sources, which vary from one country to the other. As for the carbon
prices, a complete list of sources used to create the data points is available upon request.
Table B.2 summarises the information recorded.
Table B.2: Institutional design
Carbon Tax Emissions Trading System
Price signal Tax rate (Spot/Futures) Allowance price





*The only GHG covered by carbon taxes is obviously CO2.
Note: For each jurisdiction and year, except price, all information is coded as a binary entry.
Calculating total coverage (as a share of total GHG emissions) of carbon pricing





k qi,t,j,k × 1i,t,j,k
qGHGi,t
(B1)
where qi,t,j,k represents jurisdiction i’s CO2 emissions from sector j arising from the
combustion of fuel k in year t; 1i,t,j,k is an indicator variable taking value 1 if fuel k in
sector j of country i in year t is covered by the scheme, 0 otherwise; qGHGi,t is the total
greenhouse gases emissions in jurisdiction i in year t. Note that in the case of ETSs, the
aggregation starts at the sector level, since all fuels are, by definition, covered.
The calculations make use of sector and sector-fuel CO2 emissions data. National
jurisdictions: IEA (2016b); US States: CAIT (2015); Canadian Provinces and Territories:
Statistics Canada (2018). Total GHG emissions (excluding land use change) are taken
from the CAIT (2015) of the World Resources Institute.
C Emissions-weighted Carbon Price
Equipped with this information, the emissions-weighted price (ECP) can be computed
at the sectoral or economy-wide level. In the former case, the weights are the emissions
as a share of a sector’s total GHG emissions; in the latter, the weights are the emissions
as a share of the jurisdiction’s total GHG emissions. Formally, the ECP of sector j of
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country i in year t is expressed as
ECPi,t,j =
∑
k[τi,t,j,k × (qtaxi,t,j,k + q
ets,tax





where τi,t,j,k is the carbon tax rate applicable to fuel k in sector j of country i at time
t, qtaxi,t,j,k is the amount of CO2 emissions covered by a tax only, pi,t,j is the price of an
emission permit, qetsi,t,j,k is the amount of CO2 emissions covered by an ETS, q
ets,tax
i,t,j,k is the
amount of CO2 emissions covered by both an ETS and a tax and qGHGi,t,j is the quantity
of GHG emitted by sector j of country i in year t.
An economy-wide ECP is then computed as a weighted average of the carbon rates





(ECPi,t,j × γi,t,j) (C2)
where γi,t represents the GHG emissions of sector i as a share of the economy’s (juris-
diction’s) total GHG emissions, i.e.
qGHGi,t,j
qGHGi,t
. For the purpose of the present study, only the
economy-wide ECP is computed and both a time-varying and fixed weights version of
the ECP are calculated. The fixed-weights ECP uses 2013 emissions data.
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D Jurisdictions with carbon pricing
Table D.1: Jurisdictions with implemented carbon pricing schemes as of 2018
Jurisdiction Emissions Carbon tax ECP - 2015 ECP-2018
Trading (2015 $US) (2015 $US)
Austria 2005 - 4.04 7.9
Belgium 2005 - 3.15 6.18
Bulgaria 2007 - 5.64 11.12
Cyprus 2005 - 4.7 9.8
Czech Republic 2005 - 6.06 11.89
Denmark 2005 1992 16.07 8.09
Estonia 2005 2000 8.48 13.34
Finland 2005 1990 35.53 43.95
France 2005 2014 6.49 17.32
Germany 2005 - 5.07 9.96
Greece 2005 - 5.51 11.04
Hungary 2005 - 3.28 6.45
Iceland 2008 2010 6.68 19
Ireland 2005 2010 10.29 12.81
Italy 2005 - 3.89 7.66
Japan - 2012 1.24 1.87
Kazakhstan 2013 - 0.01 †
Korea, Rep. 2015 6.78 14.11
Latvia 2005 1995 2.34 4.61
Liechtenstein 2008 -
Lithuania 2005 - 2.73 5.42
Luxembourg 2005 - 1.44 2.81
Malta 2005 - 5.73 11.15
Mexico - 2014 1.42 1.42
Netherlands 2005 - 4.61 9.02
New Zealand 2008 - 1.91 6.32
Norway 2007 1991 40.85 39.39
Poland 2005 1990 5.4 10.73
Portugal 2005 2015 7.36 12.59
Romania 2007 - 4.15 8.23
Slovak Republic 2005 - 4.86 9.61
Slovenia 2005 1996 12.87 16.93
Spain 2005 - 4.21 8.32
Sweden 2005 1991 87.86 91.3
Switzerland 2008 2008 17.3
United Kingdom 2005 2013 12.16 16.32
Alberta* 2007 -
Beijing 2013 - n.a.
British Columbia - 2008 16.85 19.66
California 2009 - 9.66 11.54
Chongqing 2014 - n.a.
Connecticut 2009 - 1.09 0.75
Delaware 2009 - 1.74 1.20
Guangdong 2013 - n.a.
Hubei 2013 - n.a.
Kyoto 2011 - †
Maine 2009 - 0.5 0.35
Maryland 2009 - 1.57 1.08
Massachusetts 2009 - 1.09 0.75
New Hampshire 2009 - 1.4 0.97
New York 2009 - 0.99 0.68
Quebec 2013 - 6.7 7.93
Rhode Island 2009 - 1.62 1.12
Saitama 2011 - †
Shanghai 2013 - n.a.
Shenzhen 2013 - n.a.
Tianjin 2013 - n.a.
Tokyo 2010 - †
Vermont 2009 - 0.02 0.01
†: missing information at the time of writing – Chile: 2017; South Africa: 2016; New Jersey’s scheme
was discontinued in 2011, Australia’s in 2012.
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